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Characterizing the requirement of a physical consequence as an "anachronism, "67 the court has decided that mental or emotional distress no longer
should be treated as a second class tort.68 Molien does not guarantee success
to any plaintiff on his claim for negligently inflicted mental or emotional
distress. Proof of damages may pose a difficult, if not impossible, obstacle
for many plaintiffs. 69 Molien only assures that California plaintiffs who suffer serious mental or emotional injuries will have the opportunity to present their claims to a jury. 70 The circumstances of the case will determine
whether the plaintiff has a genuine claim; 71 any physical injuries will serve
merely as an additional basis for recovery.
CARLJ. SPECTOR

NONVIOLENT OCCURRENCE THAT
CAUSES PRODUCT LOSS NOT
ACTIONABLE UNDER SECTION 402A
Gibson v. Reliable Chevrolet, Inc.'
Sherrie Kay Gibson purchased a new car from Reliable Chevrolet, Inc.
of Springfield, Missouri, in November 1976. She drove the car 23,500 miles
Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 620-21, 249 N.E.2d 419, 425, 301 N.Y.S.2d
554, 563 (1969) (Keating, J., dissenting); W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 12, at 51;
id. § 54, at 328; Leibson, supra note 13, at 182; Magruder, supranote 26, at 1058-59;
Simons, supra note 13, at 39; Comment, supra note 5, at 1245.
67. 27 Cal. 3d at 919, 616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
68. Id. ("[I]n the light of contemporary knowledge we conclude that emotional
injury may be fully as severe and debilitating as physical harm, and is no less deserving of redress.").
69. See Comment, supra note 5, at 1258-62.
70. The court cited State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d
330, 240 P. 2d 282 (1952), for the proposition thatjurors, by their own experience,
are best situated to determine whether the defendant's conduct has caused emotional distress. 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839. In his
dissent, Judge Clark stated that the majority incorrectly relied on Siliznoff. He said
that Siliznoff was intended to apply only to intentional inflictions of emotional
distress. "A different and difficult medical question is presented when the resulting
traumatic effect of mental distress must be determined. It is this question which
the majority would depend onjurors to answer." Id. at 935, 616 P.2d at 824, 167
Cal. Rptr. at 842 (Clark, J., dissenting).
71. 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
1.

608 S.W.2d 471 (Mo. App., S.D. 1980).
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during the next eighteen months. 2 In May 1978, the heater core of the engine
ruptured while she was driving, and the engine coolant escaped. Shortly after
the coolant escaped, the engine overheated and was damaged beyond repair.
Gibson sued Reliable Chevrolet and General Motors Corporation seeking
actual and punitive damages under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.3 She asserted that the water temperature gauge always "rested
on the zero position" and that had it been functioning properly, she would
have been forewarned that her engine was overheating in time to avoid the
irreparable damage. The jury awarded Gibson actual damages of $1,140
and punitive damages of $2,000. On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals
for the Southern District reversed, holding that when only the product is
from a "violent ocdamaged, the plaintiff must show that the loss resulted
4
currence" to recover damages under section 402A.
The doctrine of section 402A is a tort remedy developed over the last6
two decades. 5 Under section 402A, a consumer who suffers physical harm
because of a defective and unreasonably dangerous product may recover
his damages from the seller or manufacturer. Recovery is allowed irrespective of the existence of warranties. 7 The extent to which property losses are
compensable under section 402A is a complicated matter. Essentially, there
are four types of property damages: damage to property other than the product; physical damage to the product; direct economic loss, i.e., lost product value or loss of the bargain; and indirect economic loss, i.e., consequential losses, such as lost profits." It is well settled that recovery under
section 402A is allowed for damage to property other than the product and
2. The regular warranty on the car had expired prior to the incident. Id. at
472.

3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The plaintiff's verdict directing instruction submitting liability under § 402A was similar to MO. APPROVED INSTR. No. 25.04 (1981). 608 S.W.2d at 472.
4. 608 S.W.2d at 474-75.
5. The first decision adopting strict liability in tort for harms caused by a
defective product was Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377
P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). For a discussion of and cases and statutes adopting or rejecting strict products liability, see 1 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 4005-17.
Section 402A was adopted in Missouri in Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445
S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969) (wrongful death action).
6. "Physical harm," as used in § 402A, refers to both personal injuries and
property damage. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965).
7. The draftsmen of § 402A sought a consumer remedy in the products liability area devoid of the limitations often placed on warranty recovery. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 656-57 (4th ed. 1971). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A, Comment m (1965).
8. See generally Edmeades, The CitadelStands: The Recovery ofEconomic Loss in
American Products Liability, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647, 650-52 (1977).
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is not allowed for indirect economic loss. 9 Many courts have taken the position that direct economic losses are not compensable under section 402A
because such losses are already the subject of the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.) warranty provisions.10 Distinguishing physical damage to the product from direct economic loss is difficult, however, since in both forms of
loss, diminished product value is the source of the losses. Accordingly, these
courts distinguish physical damage to the product and direct economic loss
on the basis of the cause of the diminished value. Such courts view losses
resulting from violent occurrences as physical damage to the product, and
other losses are treated as economic losses for which only U.C.C. remedies
exist.11 Missouri courts never had directly addressed the applicability of section 402A to product losses of nonviolent origin. 12 The Gibson court determined that the plaintiffs loss was of a nonviolent origin; 13 thus, the court's
denial of section 402A recovery is the first holding in Missouri regarding
nonviolent occurrences and section 402A.
The leading case allowing recovery of direct economic loss under a theory
of strict tort liability is Santorv. A &MKaragheusian, Inc. 14 Santor purchased
carpeting, manufactured by the defendant, for use in his home. The carpeting
was sold as "No. 1 grade," but almost immediately after it was laid, an irregularity appeared in the carpeting. The irregularity got worse and repeated
attempts during the next four years failed to correct the problem. Santor
sued the manufacturer, and after holding that recovery would lie under a
breach of implied warranty theory, the NewJersey Supreme Court held that
the manufacturer would also be liable under a theory of strict tort liability.
The court reasoned that liability arose from the mere presence of the product on the market 15 and existed on a showing that the product was
9. See 1 R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILI2d § 4:22 (2d ed. 1974); W. PROSSER, supranote 7, at 666.
10. See notes 21-27 and accompanying text infra.
11. See, e.g., Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Mo. En Banc
1978) (dictum), quoted in 608 S.W.2d at 472. Cf. Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d
248, 251 (Alaska 1977) (sudden, calamitous damage results in direct property
damage; deterioration results in economic loss). See also Comment, ProductsLiability: Expanding the PropertyDamageException in PureEconomic Loss Cases, 54 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 963, 965 (1978); Comment, EconomicLoss in ProductsLiabilityJurisprudence,
66 COLUM. L. REV. 917, 918 (1966).
12. 608 S.W. 2d at 473. The court provided an appendix of all cases relying
on Keener, see note 5 supra, and distinguished them from the issue in Gibson. 608
S.W.2d at 475-76.
13. The court concluded that Gibson's losses resulted from a nonviolent occurrence because the heater core rupture transpired after 18 months and 23,500
miles of driving. Id. at 474.
14. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). Santor was decided under a strict tort
liability theory, but not under 5 402A.
15. Id. at 65, 207 A.2d at 312.
TY
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defective. 16 The Santorform of liability is broader than section 402A because
the defect can be actionable and yet not render the product dangerous. The
rationale of the court was that such enterprise liability would provide the
best protection for consumers who, by the nature of the market, lacked adequate knowledge and opportunity to determine whether products were defec17
tive at the time of the sale.
The Santor approach has not been followed in most jurisdictions,1 8
primarily because of potential conflicts between such tort liability and the
U. 0.C.,I a problem not addressed by the Santorcourt. The value of a product is clearly the subject of warranties under the U.C.C., thus direct
economic loss may originate in a breached warranty. Warranties do not provide a remedy for all direct economic losses, however, as the U.C.C. has
various provisions for limiting such relief. The limits on warranty recovery
reflect policies of the legislature that would be thwarted were the courts to
allow section 402A recovery of direct economic loss. 20 A comparison of warranty recovery and section 402A recovery illustrates how section 402A would
16. Id. at 66-67, 207 A.2d at 313.
17. Id. at 64-65, 207 A.2d at 311-12.
18. The leading case against the Santor approach is Seely v. White Motor Co.,
63 Cal. 2d 9,403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965). For an explanation of the policy
against strict tort liability for economic losses, see id. at 18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal.
Rptr. at 23 (Traynor, C.J.). Many courts have embraced the policy expounded
by ChiefJustice Traynor in Seely. See, e.g., Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248,
250-51 (Alaska 1977); Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 283-86
(Alaska 1976); Cline v. Prowler Indus., 418 A.2d 968, 975-80 (Del. 1980); Hawkins
Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 559-62, 209 N.W.2d 643, 652-53
(1973); Price v. Gatlin, 241 Or. 315, 318, 405 P.2d 502, 503 (1965); Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc., 572 S.W.2d 308, 312-13
(Tex. 1978); Nobility Homes v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 79-80 (Tex. 1977).
Three jurisdictions have followed the Santor approach. See Hiigel v. General
Motors Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983 (1975) (allowing replacement costs,
repair expenses, and loss of business use); Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co.,
26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800 (1970) (allowing implied warranty recovery
of loss of bargain, repair costs, and lost rental profits; Michigan implied warranty
recovery is allowed without privity or notice, see Piercefield v. Remington Arms
Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965)); City of LaCrosse v. Schubert,
Schroeder & Assocs., Inc., 72 Wis. 2d 38, 240 N.W.2d 124 (1976) (allowing repair
and replacement costs for defective roof). Accord, Comment, 54 CHI.-KENT L.
REV., supranote 11, at 973-75; Comment, ProductsLiability: TheManufacturer'sResponsibilityforEconomic Loss-Another Look, 8 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 653, 660-62 (1978).
See also Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 231, 246 A.2d 848, 854 n.7 (1968)
(dictum).
19. See notes 21-27 and accompanying text infra.
20. But see Wade, Is Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts Preemptedby
the UCC and Therefore Unconstitutional?,42 TENN. L. REv. 123 (1974) (Professor Wade
finds no statutory pre-emption of § 402A).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss1/28
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undercut the legislatively imposed limitations on direct economic loss
recovery.
Because warranties are based in contract, there is a general requirement
of privity between the plaintiff and the defendant. As a result, most courts
21
do not allow a consumer lacking privity to recover from the manufacturer.
22
Section 402A, on the otherhand, dispenses with the requirements of prity.
The U.C.C. notice requirements of section 2-607(3)(a) must be fulfilled
to recover damages under a warranty. 23 Because consumers usually are
unaware of these notice requirements, section 402A does not make notice
24
a prerequisite to recovery.
The most significant limitations on U.C.C. recovery are the provisions
for disclaimers of warranties 25 and contractual modifications or limitations
of remedies. 26 Because a manufacturer's disclaimers and limitations, which
are seldom the result of negotiations in the consumer setting, may operate
harshly in that setting, recovery under section 402A may not be limited by
contract. 27 To allow contractual restrictions would frustrate the consumer
protection policies underlying section 402A.
21. SeeJ. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 407 (2d
ed. 1980). The U.C.C. does not require strict privity in the case of personal injuries resulting from a breached warranty as U. 0.0. § 2-318 does provide for certain third party beneficiaries of a warranty. There are three alternative versions
of this section. See generally note 37 infra. MO. REV. STAT. § 400.2-318 (1978) is the
most restrictive alternative. While these provisions remove the privity problem in
the personal injury setting, they have not been a source of relief in the economic
loss cases.
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(b) (1965).
23. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a). Missouri has adopted this provision as Mo. REV.
STAT. § 400.2-607(3)(a) (1978).
24. See generally W. PROSSER, supranote 7, at 655 (U.C.C. notice requirement
is "booby trap for the unwary"). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A,
Comment m (1965) (notice not required as under U.C.C.; § 402A is not contractbased remedy). Recent decisions indicate that a nonprivity consumer seeking
recovery under the U.C.C. will be required to give timely notice to a remote
manufacturer. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 21, at 425.
25. U.C.C. § 2-316. Missouri has adopted this provision as MO. REV. STAT.
5400.2-316 (Cum. Supp. 1981). Under this provision, a seller may exclude all warranties, including the implied warranty of merchantability under U.C.C. § 2-314
and the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose under U.C.C. § 2-315.
See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 21, at 343-49 (discussion of implied warranty of merchantability); id. at 357-60 (discussion of implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose).
26. U.C.C. § 2-719. Missouri has adopted this provision as MO. REV. STAT.
5 400.2-719 (1978).
27.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment m (1965). Accord,

Speidel, ProductsLiability, Economic Loss and the UCC, 40 TENN. L. REV. 309, 312
(1973).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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These differences prompted the Gibson court to hold section 402A
recovery of product damages must be predicated on a violent occurrence
causing the loss. 28 The court's denial of section 402A recovery raises two
issues: is violent occurrence an adequate proxy for physical damage to the
product vis-a-vis direct economic loss, and is it appropriate to restrict a consumer's recovery based on restrictions in a commercial sales statute, i.e.,
the Uniform Commercial Code?
Although first impressions might be that the violent occurrence distinction is superficial, further analysis supports the sufficiency of the test. First,
violent occurrence comports with the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement of section 402A. 29 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a nonviolent occurrence that can be characterized as unreasonably dangerous. Second, direct
economic loss does not refer to rapid diminution in product value. 30 Direct
economic loss is associated with loss of a bargain or deterioration; physical
damage is associated with calamitous, loss-producing events. Violent events
occur quickly; this is the justification for using violence to distinguish the
two forms of product loss.
The more difficult issue is whether judicial restraint is called for in the
consumer setting in light of the provisions of the U.C.C. At first glance,
there appears to be a great inequity in applying a commercial sales statute
to the consumer setting.3' But characterizing Article 2 of the U.C.C. as merely a commercial sales statute is inaccurate. Article 2 was drafted with the
differences between commercial and consumer sales in mind. For example,
comment 4 to the notice provision indicates that the consumer should be
28. The court noted that since direct economic loss is subject to legislatively
imposed limitations, allowing § 402A recovery would "judicially emasculate the
warranty provisions of the UCC." 608 S.W.2d at 475.
29. The court gave four examples of violent occurrences: vehicular collisions,
fires, explosions, and building or equipment collapses. Id. at 473. The high level
of danger associated with such occurrences is not difficult to appreciate.
The court concluded that "plaintiff's pecuniary loss did not result from a violent
occurrence orfrom a product which was imminently dangerous when sold." 608 S.W.2d
at 474 (emphasis added). The reference to imminent danger had its origin in Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41, 53 (Mo. En Banc 1963). Morrow held that an action under an implied warranty could be maintained against a
manufacturer, notwithstanding the lack of privity between the parties. The implied
warranty action in Morrow was a predecessor of strict tort liability and 5 402A. While
the difference between "unreasonable danger" (the standard in § 402A) and "imminent danger" is one of degree, the court's language apparently was not intended
to add an imminent danger standard to the action under § 402A.
30. See generally Edmeades, supra note 8, at 651-52.
31. Dean Prosser was the most visible advocate of a products liability consumer
remedy separate from the law of commercial sales. See, e.g., Prosser, The Assault
Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1128-33 (1960).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss1/28
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subject to an extended time standard for the giving of notice. 32 The unconscionability provision, section 2-302, is an example of a strong consumer's
tool found in the U.C.C. 33 Under this provision, the court may limit or ig-

nore an unconscionable term or contract.3 4 The concept of unconscionability
is incorporated elsewhere in the Code. Section 2-719, which allows contractual modifications and limitations of remedies, provides that" [1]imitation
of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer
goods is prima facie unconscionable .... ,,3 Good authority exists that,
36
in the consumer setting, disclaimers of warranties may be unconscionable.
The disclaimer issue, however, is unsettled. Moreover, the U.C.C. does
not directly address the issue of privity when direct economic loss has occurred. Section 2-318 creates third party beneficiary rights for parties suffering personal injuries due to a breached warranty, but does not state a view
with respect to direct economic losses. 37 Allowing a nonprivity consumer
to recover direct economic losses in warranty remains a minority view in
the courts.

38

Direct economic losses can prove costly to the consumer, but these losses
usually pale when compared with the extreme losses associated with per32. U.C.C. 5 2-607, Comment 4.
33. U.C.C. 52-302. Missouri has adopted this provision as MO. REV. STAT.
5 400.2-302 (1978).
34. For the basic test ofunconscionability, see U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1.
Most parties who have asserted and successfully used U.C.C. § 2-302 have been
consumers. SeeJ.

WHITE

& R. SUMMERS, supra note 21, at 149.

35. U.C.C. § 2-719(3). Missouri has adopted this provision within MO. REV.
STAT. § 400.2-719 (1978).
36. See generallyJ. WHITE&R. SUMMERS, supra note 21, at 475-81. Professors
White and Summers outline the basic arguments that disclaimers are not unconscionable as follows: (1) the formal requirements of U.C.C. § 2-316 prevent oppression and unfair surprise, and (2) at no point does U.C.C. § 2-316 refer to the
unconscionability statute, even though many other Code sections do. J. WHITE
& R. SUMMERS, supra, at 475-76. To the contrary, it may be argued that (1) the unconscionability statute, by its terms, applies to "any clause of the contract," (2)
U.C.C. §2-316 doesn't state that such disclaimers are immune from an attack on
the ground of unconscionability, (3) of the 10 cases in Comment 1 to the unconscionability provision, 7 involved disclaimers that were denied full effect, and (4)
fully understood disclaimers may still be oppressive. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
supra, at 476-77. For a discussion of cases on this issue, all indicating that disclaimers
may be unconscionable, see id. at 479-81.
37. The three alternative versions of U.C.C. § 2-318 are silent on the direct
economic loss issues. Alternatives A and B only speak of parties "injured in person by breach of the warranty";, nothing is stated about other harms. Alternative
C speaks of parties "injured by breach of the warranty," but does not define the
limits of such injury. Id., Comment 3 notes that Alternative C is intended to follow
the "trend of modern decisions as indicated by... §402A," but is no more specific.
38. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supranote 21, at 408.
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